Trust and Distrust
Sociocultural Perspectives
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CHAPTER 1

TRUST AND DISTRUST IN SOCIETY

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Social scientific topics, just like other social phenomena, undergo changes of fashion and have their ups and downs. Nevertheless, fashions in social sciences—if by fashions we mean trends of the Zeitgeist—are hardly ever arbitrary switches of topics and theories. They reflect more general and more fundamental changes in society as well as in the sciences. Nonetheless, when during a relatively brief period in the 1980s and 1990s, significant monographs and research articles on trust and distrust attracted attention in many spheres of life in European and North American social sciences, this did not pass without comments. The sudden proliferation of interest in trust/distrust was questioned; it became discussed not only by social scientists but also by professionals in politics, economics, ergonomics, and otherwise, and this, in turn, was reflected in the media and in public discourses. As this enlarged interest mainly concerned European and North American social sciences (e.g., Gambetta, 1988; Luhmann, 1979; Peyrefitte, 1995; Seligman, 1997; Thuderoz, Mangematin, & Harrison, 1999; Warren, 1999), some scholars saw its causes in the increase of individualism and its negative consequences in society. They referred to the growth of crime and violence, to litigations and lawsuits against professionals, and viewed these incidents as signs of danger threatening democracy. Others thought, however, that social, political, and economic relations have become too complex, and that the enlarged quantity of information
and communications, fragmentation of knowledge, economic catastrophes, and unpredictability of events all have led to asking questions about trust and distrust.

Nevertheless, the tenor of much work in European and North American scholarship as well as in public discussions in the 1980s and 1990s was to describe and analyze trust in relation to "healthy distrust" or to risk. As the argument goes, democratic institutions provide opportunities for citizens to oversee activities of those in powers, and of those, who are entrusted with public responsibilities (Warren, 1999).

THE "AUDIT SOCIETY": MANAGING THE TRUST/DISTRUST COMPLEX

One example of such practices—connecting democracy, trust, "healthy distrust" and risk—is the highly increased level of auditing in public services and institutions. Having had a very long history, auditing has now achieved, at least in the United Kingdom, a distinctive status of a ritual, "the audit society" (Power, 1997). Trusting others means taking risks. In trusting, one is dependent on the intentions and goodwill of others. As advanced economic systems had to cope with more risks as well as with fiscal crises, more of auditing, control, and formalized accountability became viewed as a necessary contribution to democracy and as a confidence-raising measure. Since human nature is not angelic, "healthy distrust" is seen as essential for democracy and for maintaining the proper governance.

Simultaneously, publications on trust/distrust have become accompanied by newly developed scales to evaluate, quantitatively and statistically, levels of generalized, interpersonal, and institutional trust and distrust. It has been theoretically acknowledged that trust and distrust take on different forms and qualities. Despite that, measures of professional, political, as well as generalized trust/distrust have been based on the idea of unidimensionality, ranging from high via low levels of trust and then to distrust (e.g., Anderson & Dedrick, 1990; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994; among many others). These unidimensional scales are being literally translated from one language to another and data so obtained are used to compare nations, groups, and cultures (e.g. Inglehart, 1990, 1999). Such data show that some independent variables—for example, the standard of living, economic growth, or religion—have a significant influence on the level of trust and distrust in countries all over the world. Yet this globalizing technique ignores that meanings of the standard of living in India and in the United States are very different and not quite comparable. Similarly, meanings of economic growth in poor and rich countries cannot be judged by the same criteria. Moreover, notions like "trust," "trustful," and "trustwor-

thy" in different languages are bound to different semantic networks, different histories of nations, and their sociopolitical systems and traditions.

The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century is marked by a shift in the meaning of trust/distrust dichotomy in European and North American public discourses and in the media, and consequently, in human and social sciences. Previously, the most common meanings of trust/distrust in democratic systems were dichotomies like trust versus "healthy distrust" and trust versus risk (e.g., Warren, 1999). These are now amply complemented by the dichotomy trust versus fear. In some areas of social life (e.g., in economics), trust versus risk still remains a meaningful dichotomy. In other areas, however, the dichotomy trust/fear now dominates the field. This shift seems to be at least partly related to absorbing sensational societal events that the media have dramatized to the extreme. For example, the media report an intolerable increase in levels of crime and violence; the threat of terrorism has brought about not only high levels of uncertainty, but indeed, of hysteria. These events have equally captured public and professional discourse.

It is not that the dichotomy of trust versus fear would not have existed previously. Anthropology, sociology, as well as developmental and clinical psychology have written a great deal on the subject, whether with respect to fatalism in peasants, child fears, patients with mental and physical illnesses, and otherwise. Even more so, the dichotomy trust versus fear has always been thriving in totalitarian regimes (Marková, 2004). As has been plentifully documented, the general strategy of totalitarianism is to induce distrust among ordinary citizens, neighbors, and even among family members. Moreover, totalitarian regimes institute an arbitrary persecution and punishment of citizens, and leave them in a permanent state of uncertainty. Under such regimes nobody knows whether, when, and why they might be called to present themselves at, what can be named, the court of injustice. But fear, just like trust, is not a feeling the impact of which could be understood on its own. Socialization into fear involves suspicion and inauthentic and insincere communication; it is related to other feelings and sociocognitive processes, as well as to actions and interactions. A permanent state of fear, anxiety, and uncertainty is associated with dehumanizing social and psychological states, like the loss of dignity, the crisis of identity resulting from adaptation to totalitarianism, passivity, non-involvement, and noncommunication. Inducement of uncertainty, of distrust in communication and propagation of fear, all help to maintain the stability of the totalitarian regime.

The significant shift in the meaning of trust/distrust has been documented by numerous publications that use terminology quite unsurprisingly, referring to conspiracy and secrecy in American culture (e.g., Fenster, 1999), conspiracy theories in American history (Knight, 2003), paranoia
within reason (Marcus, 1999), the age of anxiety (Parish & Parker, 2001), and indeed paranoid society (Campion-Vincent, 2005). It seems that this phenomenon touches on all sectors of society and augments uncertainty and confusion that characterize our epoch.

In his recent book, La société de la peur, Lambert (2005) identifies new sources of fear in French society. Among them is intolerance of losing property and material goods, the fear of others or intolerance of foreigners of all kinds, the fear of becoming isolated, the fear of biological risks, and the fear of “new deaths.” So, while “healthy distrust” is associated with democratic practices, this new form of generalized distrust has become related to fear, paranoia, conspiracy, secrecy, and deception. And as the beginning of the 21st century is marked by the significant rise of terrorism, we cannot avoid noticing the emergence of symptoms of distrust that are well known in totalitarianism. For example, just as totalitarianism, terrorism works arbitrarily, attacking ordinary citizens without any choice, including children, older adults, and people with illnesses. Just like secret police, terrorists often live among ordinary citizens for many years, being good neighbors and working in local shops and businesses. Arbitrariness and unpredictability of terrorist attacks, as well as the induced distrust among members of the local community, all these have a similar effect on citizens that is well known in totalitarianism. Fear of terrorism is not an isolated feature; it has become connected with other political and economic issues. It is also related to hostility with respect to specific groups, like the distrust of strangers, foreigners, and members of various religious groups.

But there are other social phenomena that affect changes of the meaning of trust/distrust in traditional democracies. Dismantling of the welfare state seems to be another source of uncertainties and insecurities. For example, by resorting to bureaucratic solutions of underlying economic problems, welfare states run into a “legitimation crisis” (Habermas, 1975). In order to retain democratic principles, modern bureaucracy creates the “audit society” (Power, 1997). But, paradoxically, while auditing was supposed to contribute to democracy, “[T]he operational reality of auditing has a problematic relation to the democratic ideals which drive it...the audit society threatens to become an increasingly closed society” (Power, 1997, pp. 127–128). The main reason for this paradox, Power argues, is that auditing has turned into a label that is supposed to be trusted rather than being a basis for communication and dialogue.

**WHAT TRUST MEANS**

We argue in this book that trust is a relational concept. It is not a probabilistic calculus. In other words, when such relational phenomena as trust and distrust are turned, transmogrified, into statistical measures, they become radically decontextualized and considerably reduced. This is of course not to deny that for some purposes, there may be good reasons for such a reduction. However, the explosion of control and surveillance replaces the dynamics and relational nature of trust/healthy distrust by a static and abstract category and it turns it into a statistical entity. The supposed waning of professional trust is being remedied by bureaucratic procedures, quality assurances, and performance indicators, by legislations and regulations (O’Neill, 2002, the Keith Lecture 3). These practices that justify inspection and control, as well as individuals who carry them out, are endowed with power and awe. Information they provide is used to create vast databases in institutions and ministries. And so while “central planning may have failed in the former Soviet Union...[it] is alive and well in Britain today. The new accountability culture aims at ever more perfect administrative control of institutional and professional life” (O’Neill, 2002).

These phenomena are closely connected with fear, suspicion, and paranoia that seem, today, to occupy the general public and that is abundantly cultivated by the media. The media thrive on bad news: there appears to be no point in reporting good things or normal events. It is a disaster, tragedy, and horror that make good news. While institutions are being made accountable, the media have no such restriction. They may report whatever they wish. When the trust is actually being created—for example, an international coaction between Hungarians and Romanians, in which various ethnic groups cooperate in the Transylvania Trust doing conservation work in historical settlements, or Trust for Civil Society in central and eastern Europe—such events attract much less interest in the media than instances of distrust and perjury. Equally, the media report an increase in crime when crime is actually falling. For example, while the British Crime Survey reports falling crime including domestic burglary (Clegg, Finney, & Thorpe, 2005), the media speak about spiraling crime. Thus it appears that all these phenomena lead to the diffusion of anxiety in the general public.

**SOME THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES**

**Words and the Concept of Trust**

Having situated trust and distrust in various political, economic, and cultural contexts, we can see that it is a vastly heterogeneous and complex societal phenomenon that requires theoretical precision. When Niklas Luhmann (1988) pointed out that trust has never been a topic of mainstream sociology, he also remarked that “neither classical authors nor modern sociologists used the term in a theoretical context” and that
empirical research relied on unspecified ideas confusing trust with other notions. Since then, a number of scholars have attempted to clarify the concept (e.g., Giddens, 1990; Seligman, 1997) by trying to distinguish trust from other notions, for example, familiarity (Luhmann, 1988), confidence (Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 1988; Seligman, 1997), and faith (Seligman, 1997), among others. Yet it has been overlooked that these semantic distinctions have been made largely in English and in German and that they may not apply in the same way to other languages. For example, the French Larousse translates confiance into English both as trust and confidence. Equally, the German Oxford–Duden Dictionary translates Vertrauen into English as both trust and confidence. Finally, we can remark on Swedish, in which etymologically identical words, the noun tröst and the verb trösta, do not (no longer) mean “trust” but “consolation” and “to console (calm),” respectively. It is something given to you by the other in whom you trust. Hence, the kind of historical semantic change is one of reversal of foreground–background relations. There is another, somewhat obsoleto word in Swedish, förtrostan, meaning “complete trust” (in God). “Trust” is tillit in Swedish, related to the verb lita på “rely on.” “Confidence” corresponds to yet another word, förtroende, related to tro “believe (in),” Of course, we could explore other languages to find similar kinds of semantic differences.

Interestingly, those who claim to carry out conceptual analysis of trust often slip from concepts to terms and from differences in terms to their definitions (see, e.g., criticism of Giddens [1990] by Seligman, 1997, pp. 17–18). And yet, like other social concepts, trust makes no sense in isolation, but only in relation to its opposite, whether it is distrust, mistrust, suspicion, or otherwise, and in the network of other concepts, for example, social capital, belief, solidarity, reciprocity, security, and so on. Related to different networks of concepts in languages, cultures, and sociopolitical systems, the term “trust” is highly polysemic. Individuals develop the meanings of “trust” through the process of socialization and communication, acquiring locally relevant systems of social knowledge. Trusting God, parents, friends, institutions, professionals, or the future involves different forms of trust and different kinds of interaction, relationships, and communication. In daily language the word “trust” may refer to all of these forms; its use may hide specifics of different interactions and communication in which, quite often, “trust” can be substituted by other words like confidence, reliance, expectation, solidarity, and so on. In other words, when we consider the various conceptual networks of different languages, cultures, and sociopolitical systems, the term “trust” taken as an autonomous word or concept stands out as highly polysemic.

In attempt to make contributions to theorizing trust/distrust, researchers can make different choices. We are aware that if our point of departure with respect to theory-building is daily language rather than a specific meaning of trust, we are unlikely to enter the field of a common social science consensus. Some scholars might restrict the meaning of trust to immediate apprehension of self/other interdependence and would suppose that reflected obligations, morals, and contracts are derived from different concepts. Our choice to explore forms of trust in a broad sense and as used in daily discourse has necessary consequences for topics that follow and for their theoretical treatment.

**Trust/Distrust as a Multifaceted and Relational Concept**

The main purpose of this book is to examine trust as a multifaceted and relational concept with respect to the development of forms of knowledge and communication exemplified by historical, cultural, and political-economic contexts. Moreover, complex social phenomena like trust cannot be properly understood from the perspective of a single discipline or in separation from other social phenomena. However, despite its complexity, researchers often conceive of trust/distrust as a sociological, a psychoanalytic, a psychological–developmental, or a political phenomenon. While it is understandable that a researcher cannot master the study of trust in all related disciplines, the analysis from the point of view of a single discipline often leads to a conceptual problem. For example, using a sociological and partly a historical approach, Seligman treats trust as a modern concept that, due to changes in social structures, emerged in the 16th and 17th centuries. Thus he argues that in premodern kinship structures one could not meaningfully refer to trust. In contrast, in developmental psychology, Erikson (1968, p. 82) speaks about “the ontological source of faith and hope ... a sense of basic trust.” Taking the perspective of his discipline (i.e., developmental psychology), Erikson views trust not as a historically posited notion, but as the very precondition of humanity (i.e., as an ontological or a primary concept). Clearly these two perspectives, the one by Seligman and the one by Erikson, do not start from the same presuppositions. Not surprisingly these two authors arrive at different concepts of trust/distrust. Trust, like many other social phenomena has ontogenetic, historical, cultural, and sociopolitical characteristics and they are all relevant to the development of theory. Contents of concepts change throughout history and their continuities and discontinuities help the researcher understand present meanings better. But how can we start unraveling these multiple complexities? We suggest that our first approach can be no more than an intuition and with this in mind, in the remainder of this chapter we shall raise two issues.
We shall first ask whether there is anything that might theoretically relate such diverse mental processes like religious trust in god or child's trust in the parent on the one hand, and trust in the bank where we deposit our money on the other hand. In the former case a believer does not search for evidence of god's trustworthiness but trusts unconditionally. In this case trust is asymmetrical because a dialogue with god could only be internal and imaginary on the part of the believer. In the case of the bank, trust is based on rational decision making, on knowledge, and/or on the calculation of costs and benefits. In this case the bank must provide evidence about its trustworthiness to enable an external dialogue with its clients. What might connect such diverse forms of trust could be placed on the dimension ranging from primary trust (or taken-for-granted and unquestioned trust) to reflexive and calculating trust distrust.

One can suggest yet another way of thinking about different forms of trust distrust. A casual inspection of the literature suggests that trust distrust form a spectrum, on the one pole of which there is interpersonal trust distrust, a relation between you and I as a micro-social relation. Interpersonal relations are often described in terms of dichotomies such as intimate or familiar (close, kin, acquaintances) versus anonymous (stranger) relations, the house/home versus street (e.g., Jovchelovitch, Chapter 5, this volume), private versus public sphere, or informal versus formal. On the other pole of the spectrum one can talk about trust distrust involving groups, institutions, or society as a whole, which, in Giddens's (1990) terms, would refer to "abstract systems." In other words, in this case trust distrust can be viewed as a macro-social relation. We seem to understand such a macro-social phenomenon in analogy with the micro-social phenomenon (trust distrust) that we know from our daily lives. Different contexts (e.g., institutions), rules, or established guidelines require different forms of trust. Most situated encounters include both explicit and hidden agendas (e.g., job interviews). Different social situations involve different kinds of context specific limitations with respect to trust distrust. We normally expect only limited forms of trust in our relations and encounters with different kinds of professionals, with their circumscribed rights, responsibilities, and obligations. For example, an interaction with a salesperson at a supermarket cash register has different kinds of relevance than a conversation with a therapist or a psychiatrist. Considering these situations, objects of trust are quite different in nature and in extension. In other words, trust seems to vary with activity types and communicative genres.

If we take these two dimensions (i.e., first, primary or taken-for-granted trust and reflexive trust and second, micro-social trust and macro-social trust), we can represent them graphically along two axes. This representation will create four spaces within which we can locate four orthogonally placed forms of trust (Figure 1.1). And although we have originally selected these two dimensions intuitively simply by inspecting the ways in which trust distrust has been treated in literature, by professions, social scientists and ordinary citizens, they can provide a basis from which we may start a preliminary theoretical analysis of trust distrust.

Primary Trust

Let us start with the bottom left quadrant of Figure 1.1, the boundaries of which are laid out by the micro-social and primary (taken-for-granted) trust. In the bottom left corner of this quadrant could be what developmental psychologists describe as ontogenetic basic trust between mother and baby. The idea of basic or ontogenetic forms of trust can be found within various social, philosophical, sociobiological approaches and child development studies, yet it stubbornly resists any clear conceptual elaboration. It is, we could say, a preconceptual form of trust. In a very general sense, just like the human species has phylogenetically developed the potentiality to cognize, think, and acquire language, it has developed the potentiality to interact with other humans. The evidence from developmental psychology shows that a newborn infant already possesses the openness toward others (i.e., the capacity to initiate and to respond to communication).
Let us remind ourselves that, depending on the researcher’s focus of interest, this “openness toward others” has been given different names. Researchers usually choose their specific notions in order to express their theoretical priorities and foci of interest—and so, in this case we find terms like “innate intersubjectivity,” “premorality,” “virtual other,” “attunement to the attunement of other,” and also “a priori trust.” All of these notions refer to some kind of an “innate sociability,” which may mean no more than a potential for further self/other interdependence and its differentiation in and through development. Of course it is difficult to say whether, at this very basic level of conceptualization, such different notions, referring to primary sociability, already include germs of any fundamental theoretical diversity, or whether they are differences only in terms of researchers’ foci of interest. All we can say with certainty is that some notions indicate the researcher’s interest in trust, or in attachment, or in theorizing about morality, communication, forms of social knowledge, and so on. While we shall not speculate about this issue, the notion of “primary or ontological trust” starts as the self/other interdependence that, from the perspective of baby, amounts to “openness toward others.” Since it is difficult to conceptually distinguish among different forms of primary sociability, let us consider some examples.

**Intersubjectivity**

Developmental psychologists like Trevarthen (1979, 1992), Newson (1979), Stern (1985), Papoušek and Papoušek (1975), and Bråten (1998) have been preoccupied with providing empirical evidence for innate intersubjectivity and innate predisposition for interactional reciprocity. By “intersubjectivity” they mean openness and readiness of the infant to enter into relations with another human being and they have shown that nonresponsiveness of the carer leads to fear and distress in the baby. Trevarthen (1992, p. 102) maintains that understanding intersubjectivity can provide an explanation of “how human social and cultural knowledge is created, how language serves a culture and how its transmission from generation to generation is secured.”

Relations so created and established are reciprocal but asymmetric. Primary trust takes the form of a highly asymmetric dependency, whether it is child–parent dependence and protection or religious dependence and trust in God or other symbolic objects. This does not mean that any dependence of this kind would be a relation of trust (Baier, 1986). On the one hand, a baby needs basic physical and emotional security. Simultaneously, the parent is driven by the infant’s communication and needs, interpreting his or her behavioral and communicative expressions.

Focusing on attachment, Smith (2004) considers that the roots of sociability are innate and he attempts to link physiological mechanisms and social interaction. He explains that attachment between the mother and the baby releases neuroactive peptides in the brain of both participants and has a mutual effect of comfort, soothing, and calming. It is from such mechanisms that reciprocity and intersubjective relationships develop: “sociability is a ground form of the human condition” (Smith, 2004, p. 214).

In their conceptualization of the primary self/other interdependence (what Trevarthen, 1992, called primary intersubjectivity), Linell and Rommesveit (1998) focus on premorality as a developmental precursor of morality in early infant–carer interaction. They refer, in this sense, to the infant’s capacity for spontaneous and “not reflectively monitored, transcendence of the self into the feelings and intentions of the other.” The infant is already at birth equipped with a readiness for mutual affective attunement, for a mode of dialogical transaction with the responsive adult caretaker that is inherently separate and differently organized from handling unperceptive, unthinking, and unfeeling physical objects (Trevarthen, 1992, p. 104). For Linell and Rommesveit, premorality is not (yet) moral in the usual sense, but seems to involve reciprocities and mutualities that are prerequisites for later (moral) phenomena in dialogue.

**The “Basic Trust”**

Speaking specifically about trust, which plays a crucial role in his ontogenetic approach, Erikson (1968) looks upon “basic trust” as the first mark of mental life, before feelings of autonomy and initiative develop. For him the ego emerges from a stage of wholeness that is a matter of physiological equilibration maintained through mutuality between mother and baby. Trust evolves through mutual somatic experiences and “unmistakable communication” that pervenates security and continuity. The sense of basic trust is an ontological source of the self/other relation, just like basic distrust would amount to the failure in balancing and integrating the child’s experiences with others. It is the special quality of the mother–infant relationship that engenders trust.

Within this space, circumscribed by micro-social and primary (taken-for-granted) trust, the transition from basic trust/distrust involves learning, experience, and reflective thinking and feeling. Learning to trust other persons also means that one learns to trust oneself and in turn, Erikson claims, trusting oneself also implies trusting the trust of the other. There are practical consequences of mutual trusting. For example, the child’s trusting the mother is linked to the feeling of security in its own culture.

To take this point even further, educational institutions can provide scaffolding and support for parents, inducing beliefs that what they do to the child makes sense. If the adult feels confident and secure, the child’s trust has a good chance to thrive. For Erikson, each stage and each crisis in the
development of the child implies a change in the relationships between the individual and others and between the individual and institutions.

Similarly, Winnicott (1965) (cf. Jovchelovitch, Chapter 5, this volume) points to the role of trust in early infant-carer relations. These relations are highly asymmetrical and they involve the infant's complete dependence on the care of the other. At the same time, the mother lets herself be governed by her infant, thus in a sense reversing or suspending the asymmetries.

This elementary social responsibility—or premorality—which is no more than readiness for mutual affective attunement, eventually transforms into more mature forms of morality during child socialization. Trust is vital for communication and is transmitted by communication: it carries an obligation, a contract, or an ethical component (Bakhtin, 1979/1986; Komarova, 1974). Any attempts to escape commitment and mutual responsibility for meaning-making result in noncommunication. Both the Ego and Alter seek visibility and recognition by one another, as each subject actualizes his or her potential through interaction and communication.

A Priori Generalized Trust

Moving to the second quadrant in the top left part of Figure 1.1, we see that it is circumscribed by primary and macro-social trust. We suggest that in the top left corner could be placed what Georg Simmel coined ontological, a priori generalized trust (i.e., reciprocals orientations of humans toward one another in broader societal contexts). This is also sometimes called pansocial trust. Simmel viewed trust as "one of the most important synthetic forces within society" (1950, p. 318). For him, trust is above all a fundamental psychosocial feeling (Watier, 2002; Watier & Marková, 2004). It is apprehended instantaneously and hence, quite often without awareness of those concerned. And so Simmel wrote:

Without the general trust that people have in each other, society itself would disintegrate, for very few relationships are based entirely upon what is known with certainty about another person, and very few relationships would endure if trust were not as strong as, or stronger than, rational proof or personal observation. (1978, pp. 178–9)

In contrast to Simmel, Durkheim (1893/1984, p. 61) presented the point of view that it is solidarity that is an essential force holding society together. But he distinguishes two kinds of solidarity, both essential for an orderly social life. The first is mechanical solidarity, a premodern kind of social cohesion that results from individuals' similarities both in terms of their psychosocial activities, mental properties, values, beliefs, and otherwise and in terms of their physique. Arguing against Spencer's idea of contractual solidarity based on individuals' interests, for Durkheim, stable social relations are based in "a solidarity sui generis which, deriving from resemblances, binds the individual directly to society." He thought that self-interests could not form a basis of stable social relations because they are very unstable. One day the individual may find it useful to associate with someone and the next day that very person may become his or her enemy. It is not individuals who create contracts but society. Contracts are not sufficient by themselves to regulate activities of individuals. Nevertheless, despite some superficial similarities, we cannot directly map Simmel's a priori generalized trust on Durkheim's mechanical solidarity. Although they both refer to basic forces that create society, their theories are based on divergent presuppositions. For Simmel, a force binding society together is an interaction. It underlies trust, as well as tension and conflict. Groups and societies require both dialectic forces: association and dissociation, harmony and disharmony, cooperation and conflict. And so although there could be no society without trust, so equally, conflict is essential to the persistence of group life (Simmel, 1955). For Durkheim, mechanical solidarity is a force that integrates individuals in society. It is a force of the social order. Social equilibrium secures stability while disequilibrium is a sign of social pathology.

The second notion of Durkheim, that of organic solidarity, refers to social consensus functioning as a shared morality that develops through the division of labor. Consensus is the source of social solidarity and it explains the possibility of social cohesion. Analyzing Durkheim's ideas of consensus as social solidarity, Moscovici (1993, p. 76) comments that "consensus expresses solidarity in all its density just like language. When we say, 'We understand one another [nous nous entendons]' literally, 'We hear one another' ...the expression must be taken literally. The spoken word is the most outstanding vehicle for solidarity, since it always assumes a consultation and a communication for it to be formulated."

Returning to Figure 1.1 we suggest that, generally speaking, the left top quadrant characterizes kinds of social relations where society is people's home. Somewhere between the top and bottom and perhaps more toward the middle intersection, we might place the in-group solidarity, which is sometimes referred to as a form of trust (e.g., Collins, 1992). This would include the social bonding and bonding of close in-groups, social cohesion and social ties within the family (or extended family, clan, etc.), friends, neighbors, coactivists, and other local communities. Perhaps we might ask questions about Golden Ages of society that might be based on relatively pure solidarity. Could this refer to past societies of kinship and of small communities in which everybody was dependent on everybody else in which people were obliged to cooperate? Or could this refer to the age of reconstruction of Europe after World War II?
mportant relationships are developed and new problems are encountered. In this phase, the development of social discrimination and the formation of social groups that are based on perceived differences in society are initiated. This phase sets the stage for the development of social identity and social discrimination, which are crucial for understanding the development of social identity and social discrimination.
formed into another kind of solidarity. And he concludes: “The more we evolve, the more societies develop a profound feeling of themselves and their unity. Thus there must indeed be some other social link to bring about this result. And there can be no other save that which derives from the division of labour” (p. 122). Division of labor became, in Durkheim’s terms, organic solidarity.

More recently, building on the idea that during transition from constrained feudal toward more liberal European societies social relations became highly differentiated and rationalized, some social scientists have suggested that trust and distrust are modern concepts (e.g., Barber, 1983; Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 1979; Seligman, 1997), tracing their origin into the 16th and 17th centuries. They associate their emergence with the European individualism and with the explicit formulation of the concept of social recognition. Partly in response to these societal developments in the transition to modern society, more importance became placed on human agency and the formation of new institutions. For example Seligman (1997) argues that as the traditional relations based on local communities and on kinship broke down, the premodern and codified kinship trust transformed itself into interpersonal trust and institutional confidence. Interactions with strangers, customers, patients, and so on require different kinds of communication styles, communication activities, and genres. Moreover, these interactions involve different forms of trust in highly diverse societies, which Seligman formulates as follows:

> the “trust” existent between members of a relatively undifferentiated, tribal society would, one intuitively feels, be of a very different order than that bestowed (or withheld) among modern, contracting, market-oriented individuals, citizens or nation-states. (1997, p. 6)

So, for Seligman, trust is a modern phenomenon “not generalizable to all forms of social organization” (p. 6).

Hosking (Chapter 2, this volume), however, points out that categories like “premodern” and “modern” trust are too broad and that a proper historical analysis of forms of trust is still missing. In Chapter 2 he presents an example of the crisis of trust during one specific historical period, that of the Reformation, and we can view this as a beginning of a more subtle study of the dynamics of trust throughout history.

**Context-Specific or Limited Trust/Distrust**

Let us make two observations about Figure 1.1. First, and as we have already commented, the left-hand side of Figure 1.1 is characterized prima-
These transformations seem to comprise two related issues. On the one hand, we find that throughout these transformations, relatively more emphasis is being progressively placed on individuals and organizations. On the other hand, as far as interrelations are concerned, there is more emphasis on confidence and on trust as a reflected-upon and a calculated relation. That is to say, we talk about trustworthiness of an individual as a property or a personal quality invoking others’ trust in him or her, and about trust and trustworthiness as individual attributes of trustee versus trustee.

As a result of these transformations, trust/distrust has become a generalized social phenomenon in relation to anonymous and unidentified “others”; we can mention here “institutional interactions” (e.g., the relations and encounters between professionals and customers, clients, patients, and other laypeople). These may include quite different kinds of relations depending on professional categories, communicative (and other) activity types, and institutions. For example, we can think of relations to medical doctors, midwives, nurses, judges in court, social workers, taxation officers, taxi drivers, salespersons in a store, sex workers, and so on. Simultaneously, there are conventionalized (cultural, stereotypical) forms of knowledge in different social categories; certain categories have been stereotypically treated with distrust (e.g., dealers of horses or used cars). However, such categories of distrust differ from culture to culture.

Some institutions have been created to enable disclosure of information that would elsewhere in the culture be considered sensitive and/or confidential (e.g., psychotherapy sessions, doctor consultations, encounters with one’s bank advisor, etc.). While such institutions are supposed to function impersonally and effectively, they are served by humans and therefore still retain polyvalency; for example, the professional party may voice identities of the institution, the professional expertise, and that of the compassionate other (human being). Here, trust/confidence works in a way that is different from mundane, everyday life: We do not usually assume that the other individual is personally interested in our disclosures, but only in his or her capacity of being a professional expert or a representative of the institution. These personalized versus (partly) anonymized kinds of trust might be dubbed personal trust and institutional confidence. However, such a dichotomy can hardly do justice to all kinds of cross-over phenomena that one can find in actual empirical data.

The Inner Alter

Finally, we arrive at the bottom right quadrant of Figure 1.1. It is delineated by micro-social and reflective trust and so we are returning once again to interpersonal and indeed intrapersonal trust and communication. In the right-hand bottom corner we can place, following Bakhtin, inner dialogicality. By inner dialogically we mean the capacity of humans to carry out internal dialogues (i.e., dialogues within the self). These would include, for example, evaluations of own and others’ past and present conduct reflecting on personal issues and making predictions about the Ego–Alter future conduct. It could involve either the Ego’s self-doubts or distrust, uncertainty about the future conduct and intentions of the Alter. An internal dialogue can influence or determine the content and thematization of topics in the external dialogue. We can notice this, for example, in Chapter 8 in this volume, where Indian women disguise their HIV-antibody positive status.

Internal dialogues are not simply introspections or monologues but they involve imagined conversations with different “Alter.” We can talk here about “the inner Alter” (i.e., symbolically and socially represented kinds of the Alter that are in an internal dialogue with the Ego). For example, they could be the Ego’s reference groups, conscience, the super-addr ee see, and so on. These inner Alter are the Ego’s representations of various others (or Alter) and to that extent they are part of the Ego, taking multiple and multifaceted forms. Equally important, “the inner Alter” also manifests itself linguistically and through diverse speech activities of the Ego and Alter (Gillespie, 2006).

Micro-social reflective trust also involves trusting the self or self-confidence. Self-confidence is a socially derived confidence. Others speak through the self in different ways and impose their judgements on the self as invisible super-addr ees ee for example, as the “generalized other” (Mead), the “superego” (Freud), and “the court of dispassionate human conscience” (Bakhtin). Although the concepts underlying these terms are theoretically quite different, they function as societal “super-addr ees ee” sanctioning and reprimanding individuals who dissent from socially imposed norms. They are part of individuals’ consciousness (e.g., “the people,” science, tradition), unconscious (e.g. Freud’s superego), or conscious (conscience).

Internal dialogues include not only self-confidence but also self-doubt. Analyzing Cartesian method as fundamentally dialogical, Gillespie (2006) shows Descartes’s shifting between different I-positions. As he points out, the essence of mind is not “an image in the head” but rather, reflective thought leading to the awareness of self as both a doubtful and self-confident being.

Communicative participants can pretend trust and involve themselves in anything ranging from a fake dialogue, to a window dressing or a camouflage that is intended for the imagined third party to whom the content of dialogue may be passed on. Moreover, secrets, gossiping about secrets of others, all bring out questions about the ethics of concealment and revelation (Bok, 1978, 1984; Petitt, 1998).
But there are other kinds of self-presentational designs. For example, the Ego may strategically impart a specific kind of knowledge, particular personal information, or otherwise to the Alter in believing that the Alter will spread that knowledge around to different third parties (see below) either as a gossip or as diffused information from which the Ego may benefit. These “third parties” themselves could potentially become future gossipers, which the Ego may believe would be of benefit to him or her. A variation of this case could be a rhetorical speech of a politician interviewed by a journalist in a television studio. Although apparently talking to the journalist, the politician addresses the invisible audience in the outside world or some future recipients of his or her speech that might win him voting voices. An alternative scenario with respect to self-presentation would be concealing or imparting misleading information about the self. This strategy would be based on the Ego’s distrust of the Alter who might misuse knowledge or information about the self and pass it on to the third party. Suspicion that knowledge could be passed on to those for whom it is not intended would shape the content as well as the style of the Ego–Alter dialogue. Although distrust and suspicion may apply in any circumstances, dialogues in totalitarian regimes are particularly characterized by fear of revealing secrets, which will result in pretending something and concealing information, because one will carefully consider what can and what cannot be safely said. As Levada (2004) argued, “the presence of cunning and double-think is a constant reminder that both the law of self-preservation and the hope of daily life continuing as usual request conformity” (p. 157).

Individuals develop an awareness of how, where, when, and why they can trust, or have confidence in, specific others (and in themselves). If humans are open to one other, then openness carries expectation of some kind of reciprocal relations, whether beneficial or harmful. We can say that normally (i.e., excluding some psychopathological cases), the expectation of beneficial responses from the other is related to trust and the expectation of harmful responses to distrust. Lack of authenticity, pretended trust, and double talk can also function as a strategy of protecting or enhancing the Ego’s interests. For example, the Ego presents a particular image in order to influence the Alter. Simmel’s (1950) classic analysis of notions like “discretion” and “secret” presupposes that others are divided into those with whom the self shares or does not wish to share discreet knowledge.

From “secret” it is not too far from another phenomenon: that of real, perceived, or imagined conspiracy. Conspiracy thrives on secrets; indeed, it unites members of specific groups of associations and separates them from others by “an indissoluble secret bond” (Moscovici, 1987), like in the Mafia. Here we come to yet other forms of trust that, in themselves, may be filled with corruption and produce injustice and even terrorism. These forms of trust raise further questions: How can we distinguish between true conspiracy and imagined conspiracies that, today, occupy so much of public discourses and the media? What theoretical and ethical issues does this imply for social and human scientists?

FORMS OF TRUST IN THIS BOOK

While we do not claim that the structure of forms of trust as presented here is the only one possible, it provides us with a meaningful framework into which the chapters in this book seem to fit reasonably well. So let us finally consider to what extent the theoretical, practical, and empirical concerns of the chapters in this book can be framed by the four quadrants in Figure 1.1. Concerning Chapter 2 we can say without much hesitation that its content cuts across the top half of Figure 1.1, from left to right (i.e., from a relatively uniform society characterized by stability to a reflective society characterized by fragmentation [quadrants 2 and 3] during Reformation). The dramatic increase of reflective thought was largely due to changes in communication resulting from printing and literacy and this, Hosking argues, led to the development of new structures of trust. Since printed texts are available to a large public and can be read and reread over long periods of time, they enable reassessment of human experience and create a more reflective culture of knowledge. At the same time printed texts in literate societies contribute to the development of new forms of trust and distrust. Reflection also creates self-doubt (see Luther’s meditation) and so Hosking’s chapter also penetrates into the fourth quadrant.

Part II of the book contains two main themes. One theme, discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, cuts across quadrants 1, 2, 3, and 4, emphasizing primary and the taken-for-granted trust in family, relations among close friends, and in communities. All these chapters bring out the importance of ontogenetic forms of trust and their development and transformation into reflective forms. This transformation is brought to light by Gillespie in Chapter 6. The other theme, brought into focus in particular in Chapter 5, is the contrast between trust at home and distrust in the street in Brazil and between the dynamics of private and public spheres. This contrast shows the dialogicality of mistrust due to corruption, violence, and crime that permeate daily life and underline solidarity and characterized the Brazilian lifestyle in the past.

When we move to Part III and Part IV, we are concerned with questions of trust and distrust in professional and economic matters. Here, trust is no longer a basic and spontaneous self/other interdependence. Instead, we find shifting positions to quadrant 3 and here we witness vicissitudes of trusting and distrusting in their rich patterns cutting across families, professions, institutions, organizations, and lay tourists. Very different social
situations reveal a variety of defensive as well as Machiavellian strategies whether in families and extended families in India as shown in Sarangi's chapter or in salesperson–buyer relations regulated by money as revealed in Gillespie's chapter. Sarangi's chapter, moreover, penetrates quadrant 4. "To tell or not to tell?" expresses reflected self-doubt of individuals infected by HIV. How can a person infected by HIV deal with this problem in India? Non-disclosure is justified by fear and imagining what effect disclosure would have not only for the individual him- or herself, but for the family. As one interviewee in the chapter puts it: "It can also be a ventilation of his own fears but just putting it onto someone and saying, I'm OK but they're not OK about it. And discrimination happens also within the family. It's not just about landlords throwing tenants out. A lot of people are afraid."

In Jesuino's chapter we are crossing all four quadrants. While in the first part of his chapter he analyzes trust and distrust at micro- and macro-social levels, in the second part he presents changes in socio-historical and economic forms of trust and distrust in the Portuguese society. The chapters on the economic and political transformation in Baltic States cross from quadrant 2 to quadrant 3 in Mathias's chapter while the issues analyzed in the chapter by Maaris Raudsepp, Mati Heidmets, and Jüri Kruusvall occupy quadrant 3.

In Part V, Gillespie's concluding chapter returns to the model presented in Figure 1.1, and further explores the relation between the empirical chapters and the model. Drawing upon the insights and evidence presented in the intervening chapters, he attempts to synthesize and advance our understanding of trust and distrust.

REFERENCES


